types, from which other systems derive their structure and diverge on account of local conditions or the peculiarities of national decentralisation. British and French precedents have long held a prominent place, justifiably on grounds of their influence through colonial experiment and continuing interest to independent states. Other systems have more recently attracted attention in developing countries, such as those of American and Irish management, and that of Yugoslavia as an Eastern European type, separable from the highly integrated structure of national communist governments. These references afford an attractive basis for relating similarities and contrasts, and identifying potential areas of difficulty and effective responses. The close reference of the Malaysian Royal Commission's recom- mendations in 1968 (Government Printer, 1970 to those of the Maud Committee in England are a case in point. It nevertheless remains a fact that the models that have tended to attain prominence have on the whole evolved under conditions very different from those prevailing in the Third World, tending to make their 'lessons' of controversial if not of a merely hypothetical value!
In view of such limitations it would seem advantageous to focus greater attention on the experience of states attaining independence within the last 20 years, and particularly on those which have chosen to emphasise the importance of their local government structure, frequently following a period of rejection of what was perceived as part of their colonial legacy. The success of their measures is in most respects too early to appraise. Their approach and changes of emphasis are, in contrast, aspects of considerable current relevance, more comprehensible and hence useful to others seeking forms of devolution appropriate to their own priorities. Ghana, India, Malaysia, Nigeria, the Sudan and Tanzania are among the nations in question, and it is with the third that this article is concerned. It is not suggested that the Malaysian experience is one to be emulated; rather that the structure now emerging has interesting implications, calling into question some orthodox reactions. wide range of the President's functions. The marked improvement in communication, in the rapid processing of municipal applications, and in constructive reactions to requests was confirmed by senior officers experienced in the authority's affairs. The issue is whether in a particular stage of institutional development such appointments are not only the most politically acceptable, but are also in the long term interests of local authorities. The environment of the 1960s with inadequate local revenues, weak support services, discrimination by other agencies and a general official neglect will not easily be tolerated.
Another major aspect of the reform, and one in which change is now far advanced, is that of areal reorganisation. The solution of a federally inspired blueprint, though offered by the Royal Commission on the basis of adopting the majority of district areas as authorities, has been rejected.
In accord with the need to accommodate state priorities, each state has been encouraged to evolve its own solution according to broad guidelines, offered as advice by the Ministry for Local Government. Reactions have in consequence been mixed, ranging from an acceptance of the district structure in Selangor, to a partial district structure in Kedah, confined to those districts where financial and administrative viability seemed attainable on account of an existing populous centre, to at least a provisional rejection in Johor of several of the existing district boundaries in favour of new areas and the adoption by Penang of two authorities only, inspired by city-region concepts.' As a consequence the new authorities have a surprising range and diversity of resources and capabilities.
Weaknesses in the new areas have been identified, notably the failure of authorities at this stage to deliver services, or to retain effective communication with areas far larger than in the past. Difficulties have predictably arisen, particuarly in Penang, involving the relations of district officers with appointed chairmen of authorities where boundaries do not coincide. It is too early to draw conclusions on the merits of the courses chosen, and diversity complicates the task of overall comparison and performance measurement at the federal level. On the other hand. given the fact that this is a period of experiment, there are arguments in favour of a number of contrasting solutions, the progress of which can be compared.
Allowance is made for local demands and needs, and the state governments have not been faced with a fait-accompli. The contrast with recent Nigerian experience is very marked. It may be claimed that the more recent the reorganisation, the more seriously it has been examined, and the states have tried to take advantage of others' experience. Given the fact that areas are not static and that the ideal, if attainable at all, is only achieved at a particular time and for particular ends, the approach adopted has considerable merits. This may be asserted despite the slow application to their tasks adopted by several states, either from administrative inertia or an absence of financial resources to support any significant change.
Reference to finance focuses on a further major aspect of the reform, and in some respects its most defective. With irrefutable thoroughness the 1968 Commission drew attention to the parlous state of the then existing authorities, only four of which had any significant resources and accordingly a cadre of senior professional staff. All authorities depended on property rating and fees as their major local revenue sources, the former seriously constrained by the difficulties of revaluation, political interferencenot infrequently from the state level5and collecting from low value properties. The range of fees charged was limited by the narrow scope of the services provided. Grant aid was minimal, except in a few states such as Johor where significant balancing grants were given to the numerous local councils. The underlying principle accepted was that of 'financial autonomy', the capacity to support recurrent 
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the assurance by the Minister of additional aid to reformed authorities in terms of both launching and recurrent grants. Progress in implementing these benefits has been exceedingly slow despite two high level committees. Much discontent has inevitably followed. Property revaluation, though approached with courage in some towns, provoked an internal crisis in Penang Island, and has in practice secured only moderate gains in no way consistent with growing needs. Agreement on increased grants is at least being reached, though gradually and with marked lack of enthusiasm by the Treasury. In many states the Ministry is accused of having 'put the cart before the horse'
in the restructuring process. This has been unquestionably the greatest weakness of the reforms, reducing the functional opportunities to illusion, and condemning the new councils to a dangerous period of public disappointment.
On the other hand it may be argued that the 
